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PLEASE CHECK ONE—MALE OR FEMALE?: 
CONFRONTING GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION 
IN COLLEGIATE RESIDENTIAL LIFE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The greatest threat to the identity of transgender youth in 
transition is the lack of support from peers and superiors.1 The is-
sues involving gender identity that transgender students face are 
ripe for discussion on college and university campuses, particular-
ly when schools assign housing according to sex but not gender 
identity.2 The binary approach to gender on campus creates diffi-
cult questions, challenges, and situations for transgender stu-
dents who may suffer from discrimination regardless of the ap-
proach their schools take to address transgender issues. While 
some courts have determined that laws that prohibit sex discrim-
ination also prohibit discrimination based on gender identity, 
other courts have disagreed or have not ruled on the issue.3 How-
ever, the recent passage of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act un-
derscores the urgent need to address such discrimination at the 
local level, particularly on campus.4  
While litigation in this field has rarely involved colleges and 
universities, collegiate environments are often the “forefront for 
social activism,”5 so it is likely the issue of transgender housing 
discrimination will soon explode on campus. It is now critical that 
colleges, universities, and the counsel who represent them either 
prepare to address these issues when they arise or explore possi-
bilities to preempt the legal issues that will surely arise at their 
1. See Amanda Kennedy, Note, Because We Say So: The Unfortunate Denial of Rights
to Transgender Minors Regarding Transition, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 287 (2008). 
2. See discussion infra Part V.
3. See discussion infra Part III.
4. See discussion infra Part III.C.
5. See, e.g., Francine T. Bazluke & Jeffrey J. Nolan, “Because of Sex”: The Evolving
Legal Riddle of Sexual vs. Gender Identity, 32 J.C. & U.L. 361, 362 (2006). Housing issues 
stemming from diverse sexual identities need to be explored and addressed as well, but 
are outside the scope of this comment. 
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schools. Part II of this comment discusses the legal definition of 
transgender. Part III examines the history of the treatment of 
transgender persons in American courts, as well as their current 
legal status. Part IV surveys how various residential facilities 
house transgender youth, as well as how transgender needs affect 
public restrooms and the legal issues these facilities have faced. 
Part V reviews the approaches colleges and universities use to 
address the needs and concerns specific to housing transgender 
youth. Part VI analyzes the legal issues that may arise from 
these methods by examining the legal challenges faced by resi-
dential facilities. Part VII concludes with the measures college 
and university administrators and lawmakers should take to 
tackle the legal issues that concern housing transgender stu-
dents, as well as the policies needed to protect transgender stu-
dents. 
II. WHAT IS TRANSGENDER?
While the Supreme Court of the United States has moved to-
ward protection from discrimination based on sexual orientation,6 
it is unclear whether this sort of protection would cover both he-
terosexual and homosexual transgender members of the Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (“LGBT”) community. Why not? 
First, the term transgender does not have a universally accepted 
definition. In this comment, the term transgender describes 
people “whose gender identity and/or gender expression differs 
from the sex they were assigned at birth.”7 Being transgender re-
lates to gender identity and not sexual identity or preference.8 Al-
though many transgender individuals identify as gay or lesbian, 
many other transgender persons are heterosexual.9 The common 
acronym LGBT is used too frequently as an “umbrella” term, and 
so the unique experiences and challenges faced by transgender 
individuals who are heterosexual may be ignored or forgotten.10  
6. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24 (1996) (using the Equal Protection
Clause to invalidate Colorado’s Amendment 2, which prohibited government action at any 
level designed to protect homosexuals against discrimination). 
7. GAY & LESBIAN ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFAMATION, MEDIA REFERENCE GUIDE 6 (7th
ed. 2007), available at http://www.glaad.org/Document.Doc?id=25. 
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Gay, Lesbian & Straight Education Network, One Umbrella, Many People:
Diversity Within the LGBT Communities (2003), http://www.glsen.org/binary-data/GLS 
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In addition, modern medical theory describes a condition 
unique to the transgender individual: Gender Identity Disorder 
(“GID”).11 This clinical diagnosis has been reclassified as a sexual 
disorder rather than a psychological one.12 A diagnosis of GID is 
“a strong and persistent cross-gender identification” and a “per-
sistent discomfort about one’s sex or a sense of inappropriateness 
in the gender role of that sex.”13 The Supreme Court adopted this 
standard for diagnosis in its definition of a transgender person in 
Farmer v. Brennan.14 The Court defines a transgender person as 
“one who has ‘[a] rare psychiatric disorder in which a person feels 
persistently uncomfortable about his or her anatomical sex,’ and 
who typically seeks medical treatment, including hormonal ther-
apy and surgery, to bring about a permanent sex change.”15 While 
treating transgenderism as a medical disorder may increase the 
likelihood for protection of the group as a whole, some transgend-
er advocates reject this proposal because it labels their lifestyle as 
diseased.16 Furthermore, it excludes those who have not sought, 
or will not seek, medical treatment to become transsexual.17  
EN_ATTACHMENTS/file/246-1.pdf. 
11. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 532–38 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV] (discussing the criteria for diag-
nosing patients with GID). 
12. See id. at 532–33 (classifying GID under the “Sexual and Gender Identify Disord-
ers” section). The section of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM) entitled “Gender Identity Disorders” was replaced with the singular term “Gender 
Identity Disorder” upon the release of the DSM-IV, and the term “transsexualism” was 
eliminated. Compare id. at 532–38 (not using the term “transsexual”), with AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 261–64 
(3d ed. 1980) (classifying transsexualism as a “Gender Identity Disorder” within “Psycho-
sexual Disorders”). 
13. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 576 (4th ed. text revision 2000). 
14. See 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994).
15. Id. at 829 (quoting AM. MED. ASS’N, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 1006 (1989)).
16. See generally LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANS LIBERATION: BEYOND PINK OR BLUE 1–79
(1998) (discussing a transgender person’s struggle for acceptance by society and his quest 
to achieve social acceptance for transgender individuals as a whole). 
17. For clarification, in this comment the term transgender refers to a person who
does not conform to traditional gender stereotypes and characteristics associated with the 
person’s birth-assigned gender, who may or may not be seeking gender reassignment sur-
gery or diagnosed with gender identity disorder. “Transgender” embraces all forms of chal-
lenging gender identity, of which transsexualism is just one aspect. While some of the cas-
es discussed in Part III use the term transsexual, this comment uses the term transgender 
in the discussion of these cases, for the purpose of simplicity as well as the form elimina-
tion of the term in DSM-IV. See generally DSM-IV, supra note 11, at 532–38 (refraining 
from using the term “transsexual”). 
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III. LEGAL TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER PERSONS IN AMERICA
In America, gender has not always been a binary construct. 
Amerindian cultures both recognized and honored transgender 
members of their communities.18 In these early American cul-
tures, some individuals would assume a gender identity opposite 
that predominantly associated with the genitals with which they 
were born.19 However, colonial American culture reacted to this 
practice with hostility, and some Amerindian communities aban-
doned traditions that embraced “two-spirit” people.20 
Such colonial hostility toward transgenderism makes it seem 
as though modern Western culture in America always abided by a 
binary gender system. However, classical Western thought was 
not always so clear-cut with respect to gender. As recently as the 
late Renaissance period, from the fourteenth century to the six-
teenth century, laws determined sex through an evaluation of 
gender expression and looked at factors like clothing and beha-
vior, not reproductive genitals.21  
What led to the emphasis on biology rather than identity in 
gender classification? An early case in American history demon-
strates the change in gender philosophy in the New World. In 
1629, at the twilight of the Renaissance and the beginning of the 
Colonial period, the Council and General Court of Colonial Vir-
ginia heard the case of Thomas(ine) Hall.22 Born in England, Hall 
spent her childhood as Thomasine and wore girls’ clothing.23 At 
age twelve, Thomasine went to live with an aunt in London, who 
dressed her in boys’ clothes and called her Thomas.24 Dressed as a 
man, Hall served in the military, but later returned to wearing 
women’s clothing and performing “women’s work,” such as 
18. LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WARRIORS: MAKING HISTORY FROM JOAN OF ARC
TO RUPAUL 21 (1996). 
19. See id. at 21–29.
20. Id. at 21, 25–26. “Two-spirit” refers to the Amerindian concept of complex gender
identities. See id. at 21, 26–27. 
21. Leane Renée, Impossible Existence: The Clash of Transsexuals, Bipolar Categories,
and Law, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 343, 352 (1997). 
22. Hasan Shafiqullah, Note, Shape-Shifters, Masqueraders, & Subversives: An Ar-
gument for the Liberation of Transgendered Individuals, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 195, 
198 (1997). 
23. Id.
24. Id.
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needlework and making bone lace.25 However, at age twenty, Hall 
donned men’s clothing and sailed to the Virginia Colony, where 
he switched his gendered apparel regularly.26 When the confused 
colonists challenged this gender-bending behavior and went to 
the authorities to sort out the situation, Hall asserted that s/he 
was both a man and a woman.27 The court examined Hall’s genit-
als and determined Hall was intersex, so it required by mandate 
that Hall wear both men’s and women’s clothing at all times.28 
One can imagine this solution meant to reflect Hall’s intersex ge-
nitals.29 This may be the first American case where gender was 
determined by genitals and biological sex, rather than gender 
identity and expression. 
A. Claims of Transgender Persons in Modern American Courts 
1. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the pri-
vileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.30  
While the Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from discrim-
ination based on biological gender, whether or not this protection 
applies to discrimination based on gender identity is unclear. In 
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court found that the Four-
teenth Amendment provides for the equal treatment of all citi-
zens, especially those in the minority or belonging to a suspect 
class.31 To determine whether unconstitutional discrimination ex-
ists with respect to a unique group, the Court has applied varia-
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. (ordering Hall to wear men’s clothing and the headcovering and apron of a
woman). 
29. See id. (describing Hall’s genitals).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996) (holding that justifica-
tions for discrimination based on gender must be “exceedingly persuasive” in order to be 
valid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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ble criteria. For example, the Court reviews discrimination based 
on gender with heightened scrutiny.32 However, the Court has al-
so been reluctant to apply heightened scrutiny to sexual minori-
ties, such as transgender persons with non-conforming gender 
identities.33  
Despite this standard, transgender persons may still argue 
they belong to a suspect class. The Supreme Court has used four 
criteria to determine suspect class status: historical discrimina-
tion, immutability, political powerlessness, and disparate treat-
ment not based on actual ability.34 First, “[t]he Court in Frontiero 
v. Richardson emphasized that the immutability of a trait is de-
termined largely by whether it is an accident of birth and thus is 
virtually impossible to change.”35 It is possible a physiological dis-
order like GID is an immutable trait, and some federal courts 
have acknowledged that gender identity is immutable because it 
is a physiological or psychological condition.36 Second, the trans-
gender community has also suffered a history of disparate treat-
ment.37 Transgender people suffer from discrimination “in many 
areas of life, from employment, housing, health care, and custody 
32. Id. at 533 (describing the heightened review standard for gender-based classifica-
tion). 
33. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–99 (2003) (electing to protect ho-
mosexual conduct by incorporating such conduct into the right of privacy under the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). Because the statute struck down in Lawrence 
dealt with homosexual sodomy, not a categorical definition of the rights of homosexual 
men as a group, the Court declined to analyze the case under the Equal Protection Clause, 
choosing instead to address whether homosexual intimacy is protected by the Due Process 
Clause. See id. at 574–75 (choosing to focus on overturning Bowers v. Hardwick instead).  
34. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684, 686 n.17, 686–87 (1973) (applying
these criteria to find that gender is a suspect class). 
35. Diana Elkind, Comment, The Constitutional Implications of Bathroom Access
Based on Gender Identity: An Examination of Recent Developments Paving the Way for the 
Next Frontier of Equal Protection, U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 902 (2007) (citing Frontiero, 411 
U.S. at 686). 
36. See, e.g., Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that a
transgender prisoner stated a cause of action for deprivation of medical treatment when 
prison officials failed to provide treatment for gender dysphoria); White v. Farrier, 849 
F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that transsexualism is a psychological disorder that 
constitutes a “serious medical need”); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 
1987) (holding that a transsexual inmate stated a valid claim under the Eighth Amend-
ment for the denial of medical treatment for her transsexualism); id. 
37. See generally SHANNON MINTER & CHRISTOPHER DALEY, TRANS REALITIES: A
LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF SAN FRANCISCO’S TRANSGENDER COMMUNITIES 3 (2003) 
available at http://www.transgenderlawcenter.org/trans/pdfs/Trans%20Realities%20Final 
%20Final.pdf. Minter and Daley report on a survey in which “the people who completed 
the survey face an array of legal challenges in expressing their gender identity due to bias 
and ignorance regarding transgender issues.” Id. 
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rights.”38 While transgender people may meet the criteria to be-
long to a suspect class, the Supreme Court is unlikely to bestow 
suspect class status on the transgendered, since it has expressed 
a disinclination to create new suspect classes.39  
2. Title VII Claims
Because the Supreme Court is reluctant to assign suspect class 
status to transgender persons, the fight against gender identity 
discrimination has played out mainly through civil rights claims. 
In passing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress an-
nounced that sex was not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or 
compensation of employees40 and at the same time sparked a de-
bate in the courts over the meaning of the term “sex.”41 For clari-
ty, “sex” usually refers to an individual’s biological identity 
(chromosomal composition and reproductive organs), while “gend-
er” usually refers to an individual’s social identity (the culturally 
masculine or feminine characteristics the individual embraces).42 
However, such claims had to overcome a number of challenges to 
38. Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and
Legal Conceptualization of Gender That Is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH. 
J. GENDER & L. 253, 257 (2005). 
39. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640 & n.1 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that the Court, in holding that an amendment to the Colorado State Consti-
tution that precluded government action designed to protect the status of persons based on 
their sexual orientation violated the Equal Protection Clause, used the rational basis test 
and implicitly rejected the argument that the amendment infringed upon fundamental 
rights of a suspect class); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442–
43 (1985) (holding that the mentally retarded are not a quasi-suspect class and thus a zon-
ing ordinance barring an assisted living center for such individuals was not subject to 
strict scrutiny).   
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). This section provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin. 
Id.; see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989). 
41. Bazluke & Nolan, supra note 5, at 362–63.
42. Id. at 362.
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succeed, as federal lower courts are reluctant to recognize trans-
gender individuals as a protected class.43  
First, the court in Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co. reasoned 
that Title VII only protects employees from sex discrimination, so 
it does not protect transgender employees from gender identity 
discrimination.44 In this case, the plaintiff brought an action 
against her former employer, alleging that her employer discri-
minated against her because of her sex, in violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.45 In particular, Holloway alleged that 
her employer fired her for initiating the process of a sex trans-
formation.46 The court found the employee’s discharge did not vi-
olate due process and equal protection, since transgender persons 
are not a suspect class.47 
Next, the court in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. found that 
Title VII’s use of the term sex referred to anatomical gender and 
did not refer to those with GID.48 In Ulane, a transgender woman 
sued her former employer for violating Title VII by firing her 
from her job as an airline pilot.49 Although the district court found 
in her favor, finding her employer discriminated against her as a 
transsexual, the appellate court held that Title VII does not pro-
tect transgender persons.50 
It was not long after the Holloway and Ulane courts drew the 
line between sex and gender that the Supreme Court complicated 
matters by blurring the line.51 Prohibiting discrimination based 
solely on sex could lead to unnecessarily broad results, if it was 
interpreted to “preclude discrimination based on human psycho-
logical and physiological characteristics, or on sexual orientation. 
It might also be read to prohibit all workplace sexual behavior or 
43. Elkind, supra note 35, at 906.
44. 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (The plaintiff did not claim discrimination based
on sex but rather because she chose to change her sex). 
45. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
46. Id. at 661 & n.1.
47. Id. at 663–64 (“[T]he complexities involved merely in defining the term ‘transsex-
ual’ would prohibit a determination of suspect classification for transsexuals.”). 
48. 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
49. Id. at 1082.
50. Id. at 1084–85. Even though Title VII is a remedial statute, the court found noth-
ing in the legislative history of the act to indicate that Congress intended the legislation to 
apply to “anything other than the traditional concept of sex.” Id. at 1085.  
51. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239–41 (1989) (using “sex” and
“gender” interchangeably). 
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words and deeds having sexual content.”52 However, the Court 
narrowed this broad spectrum in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
and ultimately found that Title VII covers discrimination based 
on the notions, or traits and characteristics, stereotypically asso-
ciated with one gender or another, and “acknowledg[ed] that en-
forcing a specific sex-gender match may be discrimination.”53 Al-
though Price Waterhouse did not involve the issue of 
transgenderism, the Court found that where a plaintiff in a Title 
VII case proves “that the employer actually relied on [his or] her 
gender in making its decision . . . stereotyped remarks can cer-
tainly be evidence that gender played a part.”54 Following this 
reasoning, courts have found that being transgender “is not fatal 
to a sex discrimination claim” if the discrimination is due to non-
conforming gender identity.55  
In the landmark case of Smith v. City of Salem, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit continued the Title 
VII analysis, finding sex discrimination present where an em-
ployer discriminated against a woman for not conforming to cul-
tural gender norms, like wearing dresses and makeup, since it 
“would not occur but for the victim’s sex.”56 Therefore, “employers 
who discriminate against men because they do . . . act femininely, 
are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the discrimina-
tion would not occur but for the victim’s sex.”57 For example, the 
court in Smith held that “[s]ex stereotyping based on a person’s 
gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination. 
. . .”58 Although the district court dismissed the claim in favor of 
the employer in the Title VII action, the Sixth Circuit held that 
employment discrimination based upon employee gender non-
conformity is an actionable claim.59 The judge even went so far as 
to hold that the allegations of discrimination sufficiently consti-
52. Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749 (4th Cir. 1996).
53. Courtney Weiner, Note, Sex Education: Recognizing Anti-Gay Harassment As Sex
Discrimination Under Title VII and Title IX, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 203–04 
(2005); see Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (quoting L.A. Dept. of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (“In forbidding employees to discriminate against 
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of dis-
parate treatment of men and women resulting from sexual stereotypes.”)).   
54. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–51.
55. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004).
56. Id. at 574.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 575.
59. Id. at 572.
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tuted a claim of sex discrimination grounded in the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.60 Further, the Sixth Circuit also found in Barnes v. 
City of Cincinnati that a transgender person is a member of a 
protected class under Title VII.61  
Unlike the previous standard, which focused on the sex of the 
victim, the Price Waterhouse analysis emphasizes the state of 
mind of the perpetrator when the discrimination relates to the 
sex of the victim.62 Since Smith, a transgender plaintiff fired in 
part because of her non-conforming appearance and behavior and 
not just her transgender status, has been deemed to have a Title 
VII claim.63 Similarly, in Schwenk v. Hartford the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined how the perpe-
trator’s actions stemmed from his belief that the victim failed to 
act like a man.64 The court concluded that, under Price Water-
house, sex under Title VII encompasses both sex and gender, and 
it determined that the terms sex and gender are interchangeable, 
even where both appear in the language of a statute.65 Therefore, 
the court found Title VII forbids discrimination due to a person’s 
failure to act in a way conforming to gender expectations.66 
Even so, the Ulane reasoning remains influential, and Price 
Waterhouse is not yet a generally applied standard.67 Courts have 
found that the Price Waterhouse prohibition against sex stereo-
typing should not be applied to transgender persons.68 In addition, 
other courts have ruled that Congress intended the term sex in 
Title VII to refer to biological or anatomical characteristics, and 
not gender identity.69 Courts that follow Ulane are merely follow-
ing federal statutory authority, where, for example, Congress 
specifically excludes transgender persons from antidiscrimination 
60. Id. at 576–77.
61. 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005).
62. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000).
63. Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Servs., No. 1:01CV1112, 2001 WL 34350174, at *2,
*5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001). The court conceded the complexity of the “seemingly
straightforward” question of whether Title VII’s prohibitions apply to transsexuals. Id. 
64. 204 F.3d at 1202.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000) (follow-
ing the reasoning that “sex” refers to biological male or biological female anatomy). 
68. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007).
69. Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing
Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977)). 
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protections by way of the definition section of laws such as the 
Americans with Disabilities Act70 and the Rehabilitation Act.71 
Because most federal courts are still reluctant to extend protec-
tion to transgender persons without specific congressional intent, 
statutory protection is necessary for the protection of transgender 
individuals and the promotion of equality.  
In sum, the weight of authority points to discrimination under 
Title VII when it results from sex stereotyping and not an indi-
vidual’s status as transgender. Also, most courts accept that sex 
stereotyping is a form of sex discrimination forbidden by Title 
VII. Finally, courts have held that “transgender” is not a subcate-
gory of persons protected under the term sex in Title VII, though 
transgender persons may be able to make Title VII claims if the 
discrimination is due to sex stereotypes. However, the Employ-
ment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”) was introduced in Con-
gress on June 24, 2009.72 If ENDA succeeds, it will protect em-
ployees from gender identity discrimination in the workplace, and 
Congress will send a clear message of support for the equal rights 
of transgender persons.  
3. Title IX Claims
Some courts have used the Title VII analysis to examine claims 
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.73 For ex-
ample, a court held that harassment based on masculine gender 
stereotypes constituted a cognizable claim of sex discrimination 
under Title IX, even though Title IX does not protect against sex-
ual orientation discrimination.74 In another case, a court found 
discrimination under Title IX where a student admitted to New 
York University as a female was in the process of becoming fe-
male at the time a professor sexually harassed her.75 
70. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2006).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F)(i) (2006).
72. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009).
73. Bazluke & Nolan, supra note 5, at 390–91.
74. Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1092 (D. Minn.
2000). 
75. Miles v. N.Y. Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248, 248–50 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Schroeder
ex rel. Schroeder v. Maumee Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 2d 869, 879–80 (N.D. Ohio 2003) 
(holding a jury could determine that defendant’s failure to punish harassment based on 
perceived sexual orientation was motivated by plaintiff’s sex within the scope of Title IX); 
Snelling v. Fall Mountain Reg’l Sch. Dist., No. Civ. 99-448-JD, 2001 WL 276975, at *4 
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B. State and Local Antidiscrimination Statutes 
Many states do not legally protect transgender people in their 
hate crime and antidiscrimination statutes, even where states 
grant such protections to gays and lesbians.76 The twelve states 
and the District of Columbia that do address the issue of gender 
identity discrimination have used a variety of approaches to find 
that discrimination against transgender persons constitutes sex 
discrimination.77 For example, New York courts have demonstrat-
ed a willingness to protect transgender rights once given suffi-
cient statutory authority by the state’s 2002 antidiscrimination 
amendment.78 In addition, 109 cities and counties now have laws 
prohibiting discrimination based on gender identity.79 Most legis-
lative action prohibiting gender identity discrimination occurs at 
the local municipal level.80 Many municipalities amended local 
ordinances to include transgender persons or established new 
categories of protection.81 However, at the time of this writing, it 
appears that California is the only state that explicitly protects 
transgender students from discrimination and harassment.82 
(D.N.H. Mar. 21, 2001) (holding allegations that perpetrators’ harassment was based on 
sex-based stereotypes were actionable under Title IX). 
76. See generally National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, Hate Crime Laws in the U.S.,
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/hate_crimes_7_09_color.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2010). While thirty-one states’ hate crime laws include crimes based on 
sexual orientation, only the laws of twelve states and the District of Columbia protect 
transgender individuals by including crimes based on gender identity. Id. As of the time of 
this writing, thirteen states and the District of Columbia ban discrimination based on both 
sexual identity and gender identity. See National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, State Nondi-
scrimination Laws in the U.S., http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_map 
s/non_discrimination_7_09_color.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
77. See Elkind, supra note 35, at 914; Samantha J. Levy, Comment, Trans-Forming
Nations of Equal Protection: The Gender Identity Class, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 
141, 149–50 (2002). 
78. McGrath v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 821 N.E.2d 519, 526–27 (N.Y. 2004) (finding the
amendment “eras[ed] any doubt” that the law protected transgender persons). 
79. Transgender Law & Policy Institute, U.S. Jurisdictions with Laws Prohibiting
Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity or Expression, http://www.transgenderlaw. 
org/ndlaws/#maps (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
80. Bazluke & Nolan, supra note 5, at 403.
81. Id.; see, e.g., Rentos v. Oce-Office Sys., No. 95 Civ. 7908 LAP, 1996 WL 737215, at
*8–9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996) (holding that transsexuals are protected from discrimination
under city human rights laws); Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 391–93 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (considering a transsexual’s rights under city administrative code); 
Hartman v. City of Allentown, 880 A.2d 737, 739–40 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (challenging 
an ordinance prohibiting discrimination on basis of gender identity and sexual orienta-
tion). 
82. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66251 (West 2000) (“It is the policy of the State of Califor-
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C. Federal Transgender Rights Under the Hate Crimes 
Prevention Act 
Despite the limited state statutory protections for transgender 
persons, the issue of transgender rights has recently made huge 
strides. On October 28, 2009, President Barack Obama signed a 
federal hate crimes act into law, known as the Matthew Shepard 
and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act (“HCPA”), the 
first law to protect transgender persons.83 This Act expands the 
1969 federal hate crime legislation, which only protected those 
engaging in federally protected activities, like voting or going to 
school.84 The HCPA gives the Department of Justice the power to 
investigate and prosecute bias-motivated violence by granting it 
jurisdiction over crimes of violence where the victim was selected 
based on race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual 
orientation, disability, or gender identity.85 It also authorizes the 
provision of grants for local programs to combat hate crimes 
committed by juveniles.86 The National Center for Transgender 
Equality identified the three greatest roles the HCPA will play 
for the transgender community: (1) “educat[ing] law enforcement 
about the frequent hate violence against transgender people and 
the need to . . . address it;” (2) “provid[ing] federal expertise and 
resources . . . to overcome a lack of resources or willful inaction” 
on the state or local level; and (3) “help[ing] educate the public 
that violence against anyone . . . is unacceptable and illegal.”87 
nia to afford all persons, regardless of their sex, ethnic group identification, race, national 
origin, religion, mental or physical disability, or regardless of any basis that is contained 
in the prohibition of hate crimes set forth in subdivision (a) of Section 422.6 of the Penal 
Code, equal rights and opportunities in the postsecondary institutions of the state.”). At 
the time of this writing, the Massachusetts Senate has on its docket for 2009–2010 an act 
concerning gender-based discrimination and hate crimes, though the future of the act is 
unclear. MASS. STATE SENATE, SENATE DOCKET BILL COMMITTEE REFERENCE 17 (2009), 
available at http://www. mass.gov/legis/SenateDocket BillCommitteeReference.pdf. 
83. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No.
111-84, §§ 4701–4713, 123 Stat. 2835 (2009). 
84. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2006));
National Center for Transgender Equality, It’s Official: First Federal Law to Protect 
Transgender People, http://www.archive.constantcontact.com/fs010/1100409733839/arch 
ive/1102765237249.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
85. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, supra note 83, § 4704(c) (emphasis added).
86. Id. § 4705.
87. National Center for Transgender Equality, supra note 84.
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IV. TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN SEX-SEGREGATED
RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES 
While many forms of discrimination have declined, more subtle 
forms of discrimination reveal underlying prejudices.88 In the 
gender identity context, most institutions do not have formal poli-
cies in place to indicate what criteria determine whether a person 
can live in the residence of their gender identity rather than their 
“birth-assigned” gender.89 Despite the complexities discussed in 
this comment, these facilities may just assume that sex is a 
“cleaner category.”90 Often, untrained intake staffers make the in-
itial determination about what characteristics place a resident in 
male or female facilities.91  
While using these categories to separate residents does not ap-
pear to have a “sinister purpose” on its surface, the underlying 
rationale seems to rely on the belief that sex segregation decreas-
es violence.92 Sex-segregated facilities like shelters and bathrooms 
are “necessary to daily survival,” and prisons and school dorms 
are often mandatory, so placement contrary to gender identity 
can result only in psychological damage, but also in a physically 
dangerous situation.93 These gender classification rules have be-
come the “heart of many controversies regarding the rights of 
transgender people” in many areas, including education.94 These 
controversies frequently reveal those underlying prejudices about 
transgender people, such as the stereotype that they are “impos-
88. William D. Araiza, Constitutional Rules and Institutional Roles: The Fate of the
Equal Protection Class of One and What It Means for Congressional Power to Enforce Con-
stitutional Rights, 62 SMU L. REV. 27, 74–75 (2009). 
89. Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 775 (2008).
90. Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of
Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1350 (2009). 
91. Spade, supra note 89, at 775.
92. Amara S. Chaudhry, Lessons from Jim Crow: What Those Seeking Self-
Determination for Transgender Individuals Can Learn from America’s History with Racial 
Classification Categories, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 505, 507 (2009). 
93. B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1395 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“[A] child who is in the
state’s custody has a . . . right to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions on 
. . . [his or her] emotional well-being . . . [since] traumatic experiences can have an indeli-
ble effect upon their emotional and psychological well-being.”); Spade, supra note 89, at 
776. 
94. See Dean Spade, Compliance Is Gendered: Struggling for Gender Self-
Determination in a Hostile Economy, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 219, 229 (Paisley Currah et 
al. eds., 2006); Spade, supra note 89, at 776.  
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ters” or “sexual predators.”95 Therefore, the policies for classifica-
tion arise from fear, not an actual documented decrease in vi-
olence where the sexes are segregated.96 Ultimately, prohibiting 
gender identity discrimination will prevent facilities from forcing 
their transgender residents to live in environments hostile to 
their current gender identity.97  
In practice, jurisdictions that protect against gender identity 
discrimination provide resources and regulations to guide these 
sorts of decisions in facilities housing transgender people.98 How-
ever, even these measures are not enough since advocates report 
a lack of awareness or failure to comply with guidelines, meaning 
they “are generally under-enforced.”99 However, since so few ju-
risdictions have these sorts of gender identity-inclusive antidi-
scrimination laws, there is little legal guidance for these issues.100 
These gender-segregated facilities often place transgender 
youth “in homes that do not conform to their gender identity be-
cause policy dictates that members of different biological sexes 
cannot dorm together.”101 Lack of social acceptance for transgen-
derism among the other youth may create safety concerns due to 
lack of social acceptance.102 “There is also the risk of psychological 
harm due to denial of the youth’s gender identity.”103 
95. Spade, supra note 89, at 776–77.
96. Chaudhry, supra note 92, at 507.
97. See Rudy Estrada & Jody Marksamer, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender
Young People in State Custody: Making the Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice Systems 
Safe for All Youth Through Litigation, Advocacy, and Education, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 415, 
423 (2006) (describing the disapproval transgender youth receive from their caretakers); 
Spade, supra note 89, at 776. 
98. Spade, supra note 89, at 777; see, e.g., N.Y. CITY COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
GUIDELINES REGARDING GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION: A FORM OF GENDER DISCRIM-
INATION PROHIBITED BY THE NEW YORK CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 7 (2006), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/cchr/pdf/GenderDis_English.pdf; S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, 
COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES TO PROHIBIT GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION (Dec. 10, 2003), 
http://www.sf-hrc.org/index.aspx?page=29. 
99. Spade, supra note 89, at 777.
100. Id. 
 101. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 287 (citing Doe v. Bell, 754 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2003)).  
 102. Id. 
103. Id. 
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A. Foster Care and Youth Shelters 
Since transgender youth are more likely to face situations like 
family rejection, lack of school access, and difficulties with social 
services, the need to have access to facilities like foster care and 
shelters is great.104 In general, homeless shelters assign residents 
by biological sex, not gender identity.105 This “common sense” 
practice defines gender under the assumption that “gender is as-
signed at birth and remains the same permanently.”106 This ap-
proach is a common practice, as evidenced by campaigns against 
shelters demanding written policies allowing gender identity 
placement.107 For example, campaigns waged in Boston and New 
York resulted in laws clearly indicating that forcing a person to 
use a facility that did not comport with his or her gender identity 
was unlawful discrimination.108 Prior to these campaigns, the tar-
geted shelters placed “transgender women in men’s shelters and 
transgender men in women’s shelters.”109 
However, there are still few alternative policies to assigning 
placement based on sex rather than gender identity, and they 
“tend to be informal and inconsistently applied.”110 For example, 
the largest youth shelter in New York City, Covenant House, 
sometimes “allow[s] transgender girls to live in their girls’ dorms, 
but [this sort of accommodation] is inconsistent.”111 Unfortunately, 
facility staffs sometimes harass transgender youth and fail to 
protect them from harassment and violence by other youth.112 
 104. Bryan N. Cochran et al., Challenges Faced by Homeless Sexual Minorities: Com-
parison of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Homeless Adolescents with Their He-
terosexual Counterparts, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 773, 773–74 (2002); Dean Spade, Keynote 
Address: Trans Law & Politics on a Neoliberal Landscape, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 353, 358 (2009). 
 105. Spade, supra note 89, at 778. 
106. Id. 
107. Id.; see, e.g., Ellen J. Silberman, Mayor Set to Approve Transgender Protection, B. 
HERALD, Oct. 24, 2002, at 3; N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF HOMELESS SERVS., PROCEDURE NO. 06-1-
31 (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://www.srlp.org/files/DHS_trans_policy.pdf. 
 108. TURNER, supra note 107; NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF HOMELESS SERVICES, supra 
note 107.  
 109. Spade, supra note 89, at 778. 
110. Id. at 779–80. 
111. Id. at 780. Spade conducted a series of trainings on transgender antidiscrimina-
tion for Covenant House in 2003 and 2004, forming a relationship with the organization 
and learning about its continual difficulties with staff discrimination against transgender 
youth and placement of transgender youth. Id. at 780 n.248. 
112. Id. at 780. 
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Homeless transgender juveniles often face verbal and physical at-
tacks in shelters, especially where beds are assigned according to 
sex and not gender identity.113 While some foster care systems 
created new policies in response to lawsuits alleging discrimina-
tion, no system has created a policy that clearly protects trans-
gender youth from placement in facilities contrary to their gender 
identity.114 Since birth-assigned gender placement is still the 
“common sense” method, new policies do not always guide the ac-
tual administrative practices.115  Therefore, for some transgender 
youth, living on the street may sometimes be a more comfortable 
option than a shelter if a shelter does not support and protect the 
gender identity of its residents.116 
New York has also found that transgender juveniles diagnosed 
with GID qualify as disabled under New York’s Human Rights 
Law.117 Therefore, a court found that under state human rights 
law, the foster care home that housed the transgender youth 
plaintiff discriminated against the youth by requiring her to ad-
here to the dress code, which prohibited her from dressing as a 
woman, based on her biological gender.118 The court found the fos-
ter care facility needed to reasonably accommodate the disability 
of the plaintiff and exempt her from the dress code.119 However, 
the court also stated that it is “well established that a disabled 
person is not entitled to a [sic] accommodation that would jeo-
pardize the health and well-being of others.”120  
Even so, the court distinguished between the adverse treat-
ment of people with disabilities based on a real need for protec-
tion, as opposed to overbroad generalizations used to justify dis-
crimination.121 In this case, the foster care home asserted that its 
dress policy was necessary to protect the residents and staff, as 
 113. ROB WORONOFF ET AL., CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, OUT OF THE 
MARGINS: A REPORT ON REGIONAL LISTENING FORUMS HIGHLIGHTING THE EXPERIENCES OF 
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUESTIONING YOUTH IN CARE 37 (2004), 
available at http://www.cwla.org/programs/culture/outofthemargins.pdf. 
 114. Spade, supra note 89, at 780.  
115. Id. at 778–79. 
 116. WORONOFF, supra note 113, at 37. 
117. Doe v. Bell, 754 N.Y.S.2d 846, 851 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003). 
118. Id. at 855–56. 
119. Id. at 856 (noting that the exemption applies “to the extent it bars her from wear-
ing skirts and dresses”). 
120. Id. at 854 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 73–74 (2002)). 
121. Id. at 854–55. 
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“there [were] many boys who [were] not emotionally mature and 
who [felt] confused or threatened by the presence of a transgen-
dered boy among them and [were] prone to act out when he [was] 
nearby.”122 This argument did not persuade the court.123 In addi-
tion, the court found that even though other facilities for LGBT 
youth existed, and one of these had ejected the plaintiff due to her 
misconduct, their presence did not excuse her current facility 
from reasonably accommodating her.124 The facility did not meet 
its “obligation to act in a nondiscriminatory fashion . . . merely by 
providing a small number of facilities [that treat] children . . . 
with GID . . . nondiscriminator[ily].”125 
B. Prisons and Juvenile Detention Facilities 
States that have written policies regarding the placement of 
transgender prisoners do not mention gender identity as a factor 
in prisoner placement.126 Overall, since the majority of transgend-
er people cannot or do not access genital surgery, genital or birth-
assigned gender rules result in the majority of transgender people 
being placed in prisons inappropriate to their current gender.127 
“For these prisoners, the application of birth-gender or genital-
based policies creates an urgent issue of personal safety.”128 
Further, other issues specific to young people arise in juvenile 
detention centers. In R.G. v. Koller, three LGBT juveniles, includ-
ing one transgender youth, claimed equal protection violations.129 
A juvenile correctional facility, which housed the three individu-
als in the past using isolation to protect the LGBT youths from 
122. Id. at 855. 
123. Id.  
124. Id. at 855–56. 
125. Id. at 856 (emphasis omitted). 
126. See, e.g., Ala. Dep’t of Corr., Admin. Regulation No. 637 (2005), available at http:// 
www.doc.state.al.us/docs/AdminRegs/AR637.pdf; Colo. Dep’t of Corr., Admin. Regulation 
No. 700-14 (2005), available at http://exdoc.state.co.us/userfiles/regulations/pdf/0700_14. 
pdf; Idaho Dep’t of Corr., Directive No. 303.02.01.002 (2003), available at http://www.corre 
ctions.state.id.us/policy/int3030201002.pdf; Idaho Dep’t of Corr., Directive No. 401.06.03. 
501 (2003), available at http://www.corrections.state.id.us/policy/int4010603501.pdf; Ill. 
Dep’t of Corr., Admin. Directive No. 04.03.104 (2003); Mich. Dep’t of Corr., Policy Directive 
No. 04.06.184 (1993); Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Policy No. 202.045 (2006), available at http:// 
www.doc.state.mn.us/DocPolicy2/Document/202.045.htm. 
 127. Spade, supra note 89, at 782.  
128. Id. at 782 & n.269.  
129. R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1133–34 (D. Haw. 2006). 
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harassment, claimed their method was “reasonable and non-
punitive.”130 The court examined expert opinions and case law re-
garding the use of isolation on children, concluding that it was 
not within the “range of accepted professional practices” and con-
stituted punishment in violation of the plaintiffs’ due process 
rights.131 In addition, the court criticized the facility’s failure to 
implement other protection policies before resorting to isolation.132 
The court also found that it is likely that teenagers would perce-
ive isolation as a punishment for being LGBT, and that this 
treatment only compounds the psychological harm.133 Finally, the 
court concluded that the facility acted with “deliberate indiffe-
rence” based on the totality of specific factors that the facility 
failed to maintain.134 These factors included “(1) policies and 
training necessary to protect LGBT youth; (2) adequate staffing 
and supervision; (3) a functioning grievance system; and (4) a 
classification system to protect vulnerable youth.”135 While the 
court did not mean “to suggest that the constitution requires par-
ticular policies or safeguards,” the supervisory facility’s failure “to 
adopt any professionally acceptable methods of maintaining order 
and safety . . . constitutes deliberate indifference.”136 
C. Bathroom Access 
It is dangerous to assume that a sign on a door guarantees 
safety, regardless of gender identity.137 If there is a threat to safe-
ty, steps should be taken to address the dangerous conditions for 
everyone, rather than assuming sex segregation creates a safe 
space.138 However, courts have found that the policy of allowing a 
130. Id. at 1154. 
131. Id. at 1154–55. 
132. Id. at 1156 & n.12.  
133. Id. at 1155. 
134. Id. at 1157. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. (first emphasis added). 
137. Video: Wrong Bathroom (Shani Heckman 2006), available at http://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=yFDaYIsOWQk (“Does a sign on a door guarantee safety? I think there is a 
danger assuming that it does.”). 
 138. Catherine Jean Archibald, De-Clothing Sex-Based Classifications—Same-Sex 
Marriage Is Just the Beginning: Achieving Formal Sex Equality in the Modern Era, 36 N. 
KY. L. REV. 1, 39 (2009). “If a bathroom is a dangerous place, then people of the same sex 
as the potential attacker are also in danger, and the government or institution should take 
steps to alleviate the dangerous conditions for the potential same-sex as well as opposite-
sex victims.” Id. 
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transgender female to use the women’s faculty restroom does not 
create a hostile work environment where several alternate re-
strooms are available to female staff.139 Even so, in Cruzan v. Spe-
cial School District, the plaintiff, a female teacher, argued that it 
was judicial abuse “for a male judge to decide that reasonable 
women could not find their working environment is abusive or 
hostile when they must share bathroom facilities with a coworker 
who self-identifies as female, but who may be biologically male.”140 
However, “[n]o case law support[ed that] assertion,” and it is a 
common practice for judges to decide “hostile environment sexual 
harassment cases involving plaintiffs of the opposite sex.”141 
Despite some courts finding transgender persons using the 
bathroom of their gender identity appropriate, other courts hold 
that transgender persons are required to use restrooms according 
to their biological gender, even where laws prohibit gender identi-
ty discrimination.142 These cases are distinguished from Cruzan, 
where a non-transgender person claimed that using a bathroom 
with a transgender person created a hostile work environment, 
since they involve transgender persons who claim that they work 
in hostile environments because they have to use bathrooms 
based on their sex, not their gender identity.143 The claims made 
in these cases fail for the same reason Cruzan’s did: the conduct 
of coworkers “was not of the type of severe or pervasive harass-
ment required to sustain an actionable hostile work environment 
claim.”144 
V. HOUSING TRANSGENDER STUDENTS ON CAMPUS 
Sex segregation in residential facilities and bathrooms is pur-
ported to prevent sexual activity and to preserve comfort, mainly 
for non-transgender persons.145 However, sex segregation does not 
eliminate sexual activity in these places, and certainly not in col-
 139. See Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002) (per cu-
riam). 
140. Id. at 984. 
141. Id. 
142. See, e.g., Goins v. W. Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 723 (Minn. 2001); Hispanic AIDS 
Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43, 47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005). 
143. See Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 723; Hispanic AIDS Forum, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 47. 
144. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 726. 
 145. Spade, supra note 89, at 808–09; see also Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351, 
353 (D. Kan. 1986) (finding sex segregation has a rational purpose). 
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lege dormitories, but the argument that it does underlies the ar-
guments for safety and comfort.146 The implication of gender-
neutral facilities often raises the issue of comfort,147 but the idea 
behind comfort assumes that non-transgender women are safest 
from violence in environments segregated from men or trans-
gender persons.148 
But does sex segregation really make people safe? Labels and 
signs “do not function as locks” and can actually “create a false 
sense of safe space.”149 In residential contexts, sex segregation in-
deed may create a false sense of safety, since sexual violence is 
still present in sex-segregated facilities.150 For transgender per-
sons, “sex-segregation itself [may become] a source of vulnerabili-
ty for harassment and violence.”151 Furthermore, sex segregation 
can be an obstacle to transgender people who need access to resi-
dential facilities that are sex segregated, like dorms.152  
Most schools make dorm assignments according to a student’s 
biological sex, and most dorms are segregated by sex in some 
way.153 All students face changes, transitions, and new situations 
when they begin college, but for transgender students, a housing 
assignment can create an uncomfortable, unsuitable, or even un-
safe situation.154 Some schools show awareness of these situations 
by adopting strategies to address the concerns of transgender 
students,155 but many institutions do not include gender identity 
 146. Spade, supra note 89, at 809; see generally HEATHER M. KARJANE ET AL., OFFICE 
OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS: WHAT 
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES ARE DOING ABOUT IT 1–7 (2005), available at http://www. 
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/205521.pdf. 
 147. Spade, supra note 89, at 809–10; see also Video, supra note 137, at 4:37. 
 148. Spade, supra note 89, at 810. For example, the New York City Department of 
Homeless Services shelter staff argued against a policy placing transgender women in a 
women’s shelter because of “concerns about the comfort of non-transgender women in the 
facilities.” Id. 
149. Id. at 810; see also Video, supra note 137, at 4:37. 
 150. Spade, supra note 89, at 810; see also Gabriel Arkles, Safety and Solidarity Across 
Gender Lines:  Rethinking Segregation of Transgender People in Detention, 18 TEMP. POL. 
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 515, 524 (2009) (describing prison violence). 
 151. Spade, supra note 89, at 812.  
152. Id. at 812–13. 
 153. Bazluke & Nolan, supra note 5, at 408. 
154. See id. 
155. Id. These strategies include “gender-neutral hallways, all-gender or ‘gender blind’ 
residence halls, and mixed-gender suites.” Id. 
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as a protected status in their antidiscrimination policies,156 and do 
not address transgender needs in their housing assignment poli-
cies.157  
Some school campuses enact policies that assign transgender 
students to housing, which reflects their gender identity.158 The 
residential life programs at these schools work with the students 
on a case-by-case basis to accommodate their needs.159 Other col-
leges create gender-neutral housing options that assign students 
as roommates regardless of gender,160 and other schools have de-
veloped “living-learning programs” or themed dorms that are 
“trans-supportive.”161  
When going to the bathroom means declaring a gender identi-
ty, gender non-conforming individuals face a difficult situation 
and may avoid using public restrooms altogether.162 Since bath-
rooms on college campuses are public even in residences, more 
and more schools are addressing the harassment and violence 
transgender students may face in restrooms by creating gender-
neutral bathrooms,163 and some have gone so far as to adopt poli-
 156. See Jordon E. Alexander, Implications for Student Affairs of Negative Campus 
Climates for Transgender Students, 18 J. STUDENT AFF. 55, 56 (2009). 
157. Id. 
 158. Brett-Genny Janiczek Beemyn, Transgender Law and Policy Institute, Ways That 
U.S. Colleges and Universities Meet the Day-to-Day Needs of Transgender Students, 
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/college/guidelines.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). Colleges 
with these policies include, for example, Ithaca College, the Ohio State University, the 
University of California at Riverside, the University of Minnesota, and the University of 
Wisconsin. Id. 
 159. Bazluke & Nolan, supra note 5, at 408. 
160. Id; see, e.g., NAT’L STUDENT GENDERBLIND CAMPAIGN, COLLEGES & UNIVERSITIES 
THAT OFFER GENDER-NEUTRAL ROOMING 2–8 (2008), available at http://www.gender 
blind.org/research.pdf (describing the gender-neutral rooming options at thirty-six colleges 
and universities). 
 161. Beemyn, supra note 158. More than a dozen colleges and universities have estab-
lished LGBT housing, including Beloit College; Carleton College, Syracuse Universi-
ty, Tufts University, the University of California at Berkeley, Davis, Irvine, Riverside, and 
Santa Barbara, the University of Colorado, Boulder, the University of Iowa, the University 
of Massachusetts, Amherst, the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, and the University 
of Vermont. Id. 
 162. Video, supra note 137, at 5:10 (describing how bathroom situations at movie thea-
ters can deter gender non-conformists from drinking Cokes during the movie). 
 163. See, e.g., N.Y.U. Single Occupancy Restroom List, http://www.nyu.edu/lgbt/rest 
room.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010); U. Tx. at Austin, Current Gender Neutral Rest-
rooms, http://www.utexas.edu/diversity/ddce/gsc/gnrr1.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2010) (pro-
viding the location of gender neutral restrooms for students); Brett Beemyn et al., Trans-
gender Issues on College Campuses, 2005 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR STUDENT SERVICES 49, 51–
52.
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cies of renovation and construction that dictate that all buildings 
have at least one gender-neutral bathroom.164 Co-ed bathrooms 
exist across the country in college dorms with no reports of de-
creased safety or increased violence.165 
Furthermore, public locker and shower rooms can be just as 
“uncomfortable, intimidating, and even dangerous” as restrooms 
for transgender students forced to undress in front of peers.166 
However, schools like Ohio State University offer private “family” 
changing rooms at their recreation centers, creating an alterna-
tive option for transgender students and anyone else wanting a 
private place to change.167  
Sex segregation in residential facilities and bathrooms can 
create a “cultural ‘fault line,’” since “[v]ery few spaces in our so-
ciety remain divided by sex.”168  For youth in transition who want 
to avoid harassment or hassle, this fault line may seem deep.169  
Students on many campuses have embraced gender-neutral facil-
ities since “[l]ots of people don’t fit neatly” into the binary gender 
system due to fluid identities.170  However, students are still wary 
of risks that could lead to violence,171 so protection is necessary for 
transgender youth on college campuses. 
VI. LEGAL ISSUES WHEN HOUSING TRANSGENDER
STUDENTS ON CAMPUS 
Some tentative legal guidance on how to address the concerns 
of transgender students comes from The National Association of 
College and University Attorneys (“NACUA”). NACUA attorneys 
recommend creating designated residence hall floors for trans-
gender students with co-ed bathrooms and dorm rooms, or reserv-
 164. Beemyn, supra note 158.  
 165. Debra Baker, The Fight Ain’t Over, 85 A.B.A. J. 52, 53 (1999) (reporting that un-
isex bathrooms are in college dorms around the country); Archibald, supra note 138, at 39–
40. 
 166. Beemyn, supra note 158.  
167. Id.; DEP’T OF RECREATIONAL SPORTS, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, RECREATION & 
PHYSICAL ACTIVITY CENTER FACT SHEET 2, available at http://recsports.osu.edu/posts/docu 
ments/rpac-fact-sheet.pdf. 
 168. Patricia Leigh Brown, A Quest for a Restroom That’s Neither Men’s Room nor 
Women’s Room, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at A14. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. 
1388 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1365
ing single occupancy rooms for transgender students, as many 
schools have done.172 However, the cases discussed in Part IV pro-
vide examples of the legal issues that potentially arise on univer-
sity and college campuses when it comes to using these methods 
in residential housing. Like shelters and foster care homes, high-
er education administrators may need to reasonably accommo-
date transgender students suffering from GID. However, creating 
mandatory separate housing for transgender students could psy-
chologically damage students by making them feel isolated or pu-
nished for being transgender, as the court found in Koller.173 If 
schools do not provide and enforce adequate and professionally 
acceptable methods of maintaining order and safety, courts may 
find the lack of policies and training to be deliberate indifference 
on the part of the school.  
It is not as clear what to do about dorm bathrooms, even as 
many schools embrace gender-neutral bathroom facilities. Cruzan 
showed that gender-neutral bathrooms may not create a hostile 
environment for non-transgender students,174 but other courts 
held that having to use the bathroom of one’s biological gender 
did not create a hostile environment for transgender individu-
als.175 Guidance may soon come from the courts. At the time of 
this writing, a non-transgender student at Green Mountain Col-
lege in Vermont, Jennifer Weiler, has filed suit against her school 
over gender-neutral bathrooms on campus and lack of alter-
nates.176 It is not likely that Cruzan would persuade the court if 
this suit goes to trial, since it seems all bathrooms available to 
the student were gender-neutral.177 As more colleges adopt pro-
gressive policies, legal challenges to these policies may also arise 
in backlash. In addition, there still are other legal concerns and 
duties for universities housing transgender students. 
 172. Francine T. Bazluke & Jeffrey J. Nolan, Gender Identity and Expression Issues at 
Colleges and Universities, NACUA NOTES, June 2, 2005, available at http://www.transgen 
derlaw.org/college/NACUA.pdf; see supra Part IV.    
173. R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1155 (D. Haw 2006). 
174. Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002).  
175. See, e.g., Goins v. W. Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 723 (Minn. 2001) (finding no hostile 
environment in a workplace discrimination case).   
 176. Scott Jaschik, A Bathroom of Her Own, INSIDE HIGHER ED., Dec. 21, 2009, http:// 
www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/12/21/bathrooms. 
 177. Id. 
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A. State and Local Protection 
Some states, like Massachusetts and New Jersey, have adopted 
abuse prevention statutes, which protect against abuse by family 
or household members.178 New Jersey has applied its statute in 
the dorm context.179 Nicole M. Decker, in a comment published by 
the Penn State Law Review, concluded that the Massachusetts 
law should include college roommates because “[s]ociety needs 
additional, not fewer, measures to combat domestic violence.”180 A 
transgender student abused by roommates in university housing 
may have a claim under such a statute, if present in that particu-
lar jurisdiction.  
In addition, as of this writing, 282 colleges and universities 
have non-discrimination policies that protect gender identity.181 
What does this mean in a residential context, and do these poli-
cies create any real changes on campus? In a 2006 survey by 
GLBT Campus Matters, most colleges and universities indicated 
“that few changes had occurred as a result of the non-
discrimination policy.”182 Some of these colleges also had policies 
against people of different genders sharing a room, and these in-
stitutions found establishing gender-neutral housing a difficult 
task.183 A transgender student may complain to the school under 
such a discrimination policy if the school does not have gender-
neutral housing or if the school assigns the student to housing 
that does not conform to his or her gender identity. Further, since 
the Sixth Circuit in Smith held that the Price Waterhouse ratio-
nale applies to transgender persons in areas outside of employ-
ment,184 it is possible that courts will find similar protection under 
Title IX.  
 178. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, §§ 1–9 (2003 & Cum. Supp. 2010); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 2C:25-17–30 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009). 
179. Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001). 
 180. Nicole M. Decker, Comment, An American Household: Massachusetts’ Abuse Pre-
vention Act and Its Applicability to College Roommates, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1273, 1294 
(2004). 
 181. Transgender Law & Policy Inst., 282 Colleges and Universities Have Non-
Discrimination Policies that Include Gender Identity/Expression, http://www.transgender 
law.org/college/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
 182. Brett Genny Beemyn & Jessica Pettitt, How Have Trans-Inclusive Non-
Discrimination Policies Changed Institutions?, CAMPUS MATTERS, June 2006, at 8. 
183. Id.  
184. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th  Cir. 2004). 
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However, some may fight against antidiscrimination policies at 
colleges and universities or similar protective measures. For ex-
ample, on March 4, 2010, Virginia Attorney General Kenneth T. 
Cuccinelli, II, sent a privileged letter to all of the presidents, rec-
tors, and visitors of Virginia’s public colleges and universities dec-
laring that they had no legal authority to adopt antidiscrimina-
tion policies that include not only gender identity, but sexual 
orientation and gender expression as well.185 Cuccinelli advised 
that the Commonwealth prohibits such language and classifica-
tions from inclusion as protected classes without “specific autho-
rization from the General Assembly.”186 According to Cuccinelli, 
this means state agencies like public schools cannot “reach 
beyond the boundaries established by the General Assembly.”187 
In addition, Cuccinelli criticized localities for including sexual 
orientation and similar categories in their antidiscrimination pol-
icies—policies inconsistent with Virginia Attorney General opi-
nions from the early 1980s.188 
Cuccinelli concludes that schools including gender identity in 
their antidiscrimination policies have done so without the proper 
authority and have created “confusion about the law and, at 
worst, a litany of instances in which the school’s operation would 
need to change” to conform.189 Instead, Cuccinelli believes the 
schools need to make changes to conform with “the law and public 
policy of Virginia,”190 or at least with Cuccinelli’s interpretation of 
public policy. The actions of the Attorney General “dismayed” 
students and faculty members and revealed the tension between 
liberal academics and conservative state leaders in Virginia.191 So 
far, academic leaders from schools like the University of Virginia 
and the College of William and Mary have commented on the is-
sue, not only stressing that they will review their own policies, 
but also underscoring the importance of their nondiscriminatory 
 185. Rosalind S. Helderman, Attorney General Asks Colleges to End Policies That 
Shield Gays, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2010, at A1; Letter from Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, At-
torney Gen., Commonwealth of Va., to Presidents, Rectors, and Visitors of Va.’s Pub. Colls. 
and Univs. 1 (Mar. 4, 2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/metro/ 
Cuccinelli.pdf. 
186. Letter from Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, supra note 185, at 1. 
 187. Id. at 2. 
 188. Id. at 3–4. 
 189. Id. at 4. 
 190. Id.  
 191. Helderman, supra note 185. 
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values.192 While it is not clear what will happen if universities do 
not heed Cuccinelli’s advice, “[t]hey call it advice for a reason” ac-
cording to a former deputy attorney general.193 
Therefore, Cuccinelli will probably need to take court action to 
enforce his own opinion, even though college boards and visitors 
swear to follow the law.194 Cuccinelli seems to believe that protec-
tions based on sexual orientation or gender identity are unneces-
sary, just as the Governor believes that “no Virginia college or 
university . . . will engage in discrimination of any kind.”195  How-
ever, Democrat Mark Warner, former governor and now U.S. 
Senator for the Commonwealth, believes that this sort of advice 
will “damage the Commonwealth’s reputation for academic excel-
lence and diversity.”196 Perhaps McDonnell at first denied the 
need for protection from sexual orientation discrimination and 
similar acts of intolerance to further his own agenda,197 since con-
 192. Press Release, Taylor Reveley, President, Coll. William & Mary, No Discrimina-
tion at W&M (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.wm.edu/news/pressreleases/2010/no-discrimina 
tion-at-wm.php (“[W]e need to review carefully the AG’s view as a matter of law and policy 
. . . . For now, let’s be clear that William & Mary neither discriminates against people nor 
tolerates discrimination on our campus.”); Statement by President Casteen: Governor 
McDonnell’s Executive Directive Clarifies Nondiscrimination Policy (Mar. 10, 2010), 
http://www.virginia.edu/uvatoday/newsRelease.php?id=11230 (“But as rightly alarmed as 
many of us and I myself were by last week’s Attorney General letter, . . . [l]et us hope that 
the subsequent discussion will rise to the level of the [eloquence and clarity] struck in 
[Governor McDonnell’s] directive.”). While neither school includes gender identity, they do 
include sexual orientation in their anti- or non-discrimination policies. University of Vir-
ginia, Policy: Preventing and Addressing Discrimination and Harassment, 
https://policy.itc.virginia.edu/policy/policydisplay?id=HRM-009 (last visited Apr. 1, 2010); 
William and Mary Law School, Non-Discrimination Policy, http://law.wm.edu/careerser 
vices/policies/index.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
 193. Helderman, supra note 185 (quoting former Deputy Attorney General Claire 
Guthrie Gastañaga). 
194. Id. 
 195. Id. However, Virginia Senator Mark Warner is confused as to why Virginia’s At-
torney General would “authorize our public colleges and universities to discriminate.” 
Press Release, Sen. Mark Warner, Statement on Va. Attorney General’s Opinion on Non-
discrimination Issue (Mar. 5, 2010). 
 196. Helderman, supra note 185. Some speculate that Virginia schools will need to 
amend their admissions materials “to put a big ole’ asterisk next to diversity to remind 
prospective students that only straight students are welcome in Virginia.” Crazydrumguy, 
Cuccinelli Orders Va. Colleges to Strip Sexual Orientation and Gender Identify from Anti-
Discrimination Policies, http://crazydrumguy.com/2010/03/cuccinelli-orders-va-colleges-to-
strip-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-from-anti-discrimination-policies/ (Mar. 5, 
2010, 21:24 EST). 
 197. Va. Exec. Order No. 6 (Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://www.governor.virginia. 
gov/Issues/ExecutiveOrders/pdf/EO_6.pdf (rescinding the prior ban on state employment 
discrimination which included a ban on sexual preference discrimination); Jim Nolan, Se-
nate Backs Protection for Sexual Orientation; It Passes a Bill to Add It to the Anti-Bias Pol-
icies in State Hiring; Defeat in House Likely, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH (Va.), Feb. 9, 2010, at 
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trary to Cuccinelli’s argument that the Virginia General Assem-
bly has never supported protecting sexual orientation, the Virgin-
ia Senate has supported adding sexual orientation to anti-
discrimination policies.198 
While an unlikely explanation, perhaps Virginia’s leaders see 
progress on campus as an indicator that discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity is a non-issue on campus. 
Social acceptance of transgender students is growing on college 
campuses, as evidenced by the election of the first transgender 
homecoming queen at the College of William and Mary.199 The 
reaction of other students has been positive.200 One student de-
scribed Vasold’s election as “cool,” since “it shows how our culture 
is evolving, hopefully.”201 Also encouraging is the administration’s 
low-key support, which Vasold sees as a promotion of student 
“differences and similarities” that increase cultural understand-
ing.202 The campus attitude at William and Mary shows that the 
social movement to support and accept transgender persons is 
growing on college campuses and foretells imminent social 
change.203 As one William and Mary student put it, “It’s a general 
change across the country . . . . We’re tired of the old way.”204 Even 
so, Vasold’s parents still have concerns for her safety on cam-
pus.205 Rather than cite the social change students strive for on 
campus as evidence that certain classes do not belong in antidi-
scrimination policies, colleges and universities should support 
and protect their students and not de facto tolerate discrimina-
tion by refraining from including sexual orientation or gender 
identity in their antidiscrimination policies. While public schools 
in any state must conform at a local level with the state’s law and 
public policy, to remain relevant and prestigious, institutions, col-
A10 (noting that a vote in the General Assembly was due to McDonnell’s decision “not to 
issue an executive order that includes sexual orientation in the state’s anti-discriminatory 
policy”). 
 198. Nolan, supra note 197.  
 199. Felicia Tsung, Transgender Homecoming Queen a First for College, FLAT HAT 
(Williamsburg, Va.), Oct. 23, 2009, available at http://www.flathatnews.com/content/ 
71865. 
 200. Michael Paul Williams, Homecoming Queen at W&M: Diversity Reigns, RICH. 
TIMES-DISPATCH (Va.), Oct. 29, 2009, at B1. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
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leges, and universities should place a higher premium on the pub-
lic policy directions at a national level, particularly the inclusion 
of gender identity as a protected class in the HCPA.206 
Possibly in response to the reaction to Cuccinelli’s letter,207 
Governor McDonnell ultimately did decide to issue an executive 
directive stating “discrimination against enumerated classes of 
persons set forth in the Virginia Human Rights Act or discrimi-
nation against any class of persons without a rational basis is 
prohibited.”208  However, this gesture is just a directive, not an ex-
ecutive order, so it does not carry the weight of law.209  McDonnell 
could have included gender identity, sexual orientation, and 
gender expression in Executive Order Six,210 or broadened his di-
rective to include student protections.  In an interview with The 
Washington Post, he explained that “[t]he attorney general’s job is 
to declare the law.  It’s my job to set the policy and help the Gen-
eral Assembly set the policy.”211  Since the Governor and Attorney 
General are aware of the political push and desire for gender 
identity protection on college campuses,212 they should work in 
their roles toward that policy. 
B. Supervisory Liability for Schools 
In 1996 a student brought an action against school officials al-
leging equal protection and due process violations due to the fail-
ure of school officials to protect the student from gender-based 
harassment and harm by other students.213 On appeal, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the 
206. See supra Part III. 
 207. Jenna Johnson et al., Students Irate at Cuccinelli Over Gay-Rights Policies, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 9, 2010, at B1. 
208. Va. Exec. Directive No. 1 (2010), available at http://www.dhrm.virginia.gov/docu 
ments/ExecutiveDirectiveOne.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2010); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-
3901 (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
 209. Posting of Rosalind Helderman, McDonnell’s Nondiscrimination Directive Carries 
Force of Office, Not Law, to Virginia Politics, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/virginiapoli 
tics/2010/03/mcdonnells_nondiscrimination_d.html (Mar. 11, 2010, 7:52 EST). 
 210. Va. Exec. Order No. 6 (Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://www.governor.virginia. 
gov/Issues/ExecutiveOrders/pdf/EO_6.pdf. 
 211. Posting of Anita Kumar, McDonnell: No Special Counsel to Enforce Directive 
Banning Discrimination Against Gays, to Virginia Politics, http://voices.washingtonpost. 
com/virginiapolitics/2010/03/post_648.html (Mar. 17, 2010, 14:08 EST). 
 212. Rosalind S. Helderman, Cuccinelli Not Giving in on Colleges’ Gay Bias Policies, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2010, at B5.  
213. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 1996). 
1394 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1365
student could maintain equal protection claims of discrimination 
based on both gender and sexual orientation.214 However, the 
plaintiff in Nabozny v. Podlesny also argued that the “defendants 
violated his right to due process by acting with deliberate indiffe-
rence in maintaining a policy or practice of failing to punish his 
assailants, thereby encouraging a harmful environment.”215 Both 
the district court and the Seventh Circuit rejected this argument 
because school employees did not perpetrate the harm suffered, 
and the school officials had no duty to act and prevent the 
harm.216 
Even so, “[s]upervisory liability exists even without overt per-
sonal participation in the offensive act,” so officials who just 
stand behind a deficient policy are still liable.217 Furthermore, 
courts may impose supervisory liability if supervisors breach du-
ties imposed by local laws.218 A student may make a claim under 
the HCPA or under an antidiscrimination policy that includes 
discrimination based on gender identity. Therefore, courts may be 
willing to hold school officials liable when school policies or prac-
tices place students in dangerous environments, even when offi-
cials do not perpetrate the specific harm.  
C. Recommendations 
Colleges and universities must be flexible, and allow trans-
gender students to choose the housing option with which they are 
most comfortable, regardless of sex and gender identity. The cur-
rent trend seems to be a rejection of separate housing arrange-
ments for LGBT students.219 Some schools have cancelled plans 
for themed housing for transgender or LGBT students.220 Texas 
Christian University cancelled its plan for an LGBT “living learn-
214. Id. at 460. 
 215. Id. at 449, 460 (citing J.O. v. Alton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 273 
(7th Cir. 1990)).  
216. Id. at 453, 460–61. 
217. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 169–70 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
218. O’Quinn v. Manuel, 773 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1985). 
219. See supra Part V. 
220. Posting of Alison Go, TCU Cancels Plans for Gay-Themed Housing, to Paper Trail, 
http://www.usnews.com/blogs/paper-trail/2009/04/15/tcu-cancels-plans-for-gay-themed-hou 
sing.html (Apr. 15, 2009, 17:56 EST).  
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ing community” because of concerns of separatism.221 Yale Uni-
versity tabled its plans for gender-neutral housing despite over-
whelming student support because it wanted to form a task force 
to study similar programs at peer schools such as Harvard, Stan-
ford, Brown, and the University of Pennsylvania.222 Drew Univer-
sity rejected gender-neutral housing proposals because “the idea 
had become too controversial.”223 While the administration initial-
ly supported the proposal, it “decided to err on the side of caution” 
and just address the needs of each transgender student indivi-
dually.224 This is an improvement from the previous arrangement, 
which allowed students to request “medical singles,” which were 
isolating and carried a stigma.225  
Therefore, schools should focus their energy away from creat-
ing LGBT or transgender-themed housing, and instead find com-
fortable solutions for everyone by working on a case-by-case basis. 
For example, schools like the University of Chicago allow upper-
classmen to pursue living arrangements with whomever they 
choose.226 This program allows students to “seek out the living ar-
rangements that make them feel the most comfortable.”227 So far, 
there have been no complaints, issues, or concerns with the pro-
gram.228 This option appeals to a broad range of students beyond 
the LGBT community, since there are added benefits to gender-
neutral housing, such as the ability to live with a relative of the 
opposite sex or someone you already trust.229 At the University of 
Connecticut, an experiment with gender-neutral housing allowed 
siblings and friends who simply wanted to live with someone they 
knew to have that freedom.230 Before implementation of the new 
221. Id. 
 222. Posting of Alison Go, Yale Delays Gender-Neutral Housing, to Paper Trail, 
http://www.usnews.com/blogs/paper-trail/2009/03/04/yale-delays-gender-neutral-housing. 
html (Mar. 4, 2009, 17:56 EST). 
 223. Leslie Kwoh, Drew University Rejects a Proposal for a “Gender-Neutral” Dorm, 
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Dec. 7, 2008, at 40. 
224. Id. 
225. Id.  
 226. Dave Newbart, Men, Women, Share U. of C. Rooms; Male, Female Undergraduates 
Can Now Share Dorm, No Questions, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 6, 2009, at 4. Unfortunately, 
first year students are still assigned same-sex housing. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. See Nikki Bussey, Colleges Test Water with Gender-Neutral Dorms, COM. APPEAL 
(Memphis, Tenn.), June 29, 2008, at M1. 
 230. Grace E. Merritt, Genders Mix in UConn Housing, Pilot Program to Expand in 
Fall, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), May 26, 2008, at B1. 
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plan, there was only one gender-neutral suite, and the students 
who lived there felt isolated.231 Accordingly, schools should also 
provide resources and training for residential advisors and educa-
tional opportunities for non-transgender students to foster a more 
accepting environment.  
However, privacy in the application process may become a con-
cern. While most college admissions and housing applications are 
separate, transgender students may identify strongly with one 
gender, and feel most comfortable selecting that gender to live 
with without disclosing their transgender status. For example, 
Dartmouth declares on its housing application that it “seeks to 
provide a living environment welcoming to all gender identities; 
one not limited by the traditional gender binary.”232 Students have 
the choice to disclose their gender identity and the third-person 
pronoun that makes them feel the most comfortable.233 Even so, 
for students who just want to be male or female, and not labeled 
as transgender, this option might still not be enough to address 
the issue. In gender-neutral or case-by-case housing, students 
may feel more comfortable disclosing their needs and preference 
for living arrangements. 
In addition, schools will also need to anticipate the concerns of 
all students and parents, and find solutions that do not result in 
gender identity discrimination.234 For example, schools offering 
gender-neutral housing should still offer students who prefer 
same-sex roommates that option. While the solution is not simple, 
most students enjoy the ability to live with whomever they want, 
and appear to be adjusting to living with transgender students.235 
231. Id. The new plan will add five more gender-neutral sites. Id. 
 232. Peter Schworm, Just Roommates: Colleges’ Final Frontier: Mixed-Gender Housing, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 2008, at A1.  
233. Id. 
234. One situation that merits examination but is outside the scope of this comment is 
the presence of transgender students at women’s colleges. This situation raises the ques-
tion of whether those colleges can serve students who no longer see themselves as women. 
See Alissa Quart, When Girls Will Be Boys, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008 (Magazine), at 32. 
Students at women’s colleges “chose[ ] to attend a women’s college in order to live and be 
educated in the company of other women.” Id. at 35. Some alumni see the admission of 
transmale students as a way of “passively going coed” and transmale students were “men 
seeking to take advantage of Mount Holyoke’s liberal and accepting atmosphere.” Id. at 
36. One graduate of Mount Holyoke, Suzanne Corriell, sees the difficulty of the situation,
since “when a student no longer identifies as a woman, the privilege to attend these 
schools is lost.” Id. 
 235. See Sara Olkon, Next: Coed Dorm Rooms; In 2009, U. of C. Will Allow Students to 
Have Roommate of Opposite to Sex—No Permission Needed, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 20, 2008, at 
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Learning to live with peoples’ differences is merely a part of the 
broader socialization process experienced in college, and most 
students will admit problems can come with any roommate, re-
gardless of gender identity.236 
VII. CONCLUSION
Gender identity issues will arise at the collegiate level, particu-
larly in residence halls, given recent cases dealing with situations 
in the workplace and similar residential settings.237 While the 
trend to protect gender identity under Title VII is not overwhelm-
ing, the recent passage of the HCPA, and the recent inclusion of 
gender identity in the proposed ENDA show that the trend is not 
something that will soon go away. To send a message on this is-
sue to the nation’s schools and face the new reality of gender in 
America, the Department of Education should amend its Title IX 
regulations to allow transgender students to live in single-sex 
housing that conforms to their gender identity.  
The ultimate measure Congress could take to protect trans-
gender youth in college and university housing is to pass a bill 
that explicitly protects students from discrimination and harass-
ment based on their gender identity. While the HCPA specifically 
addresses hate crimes, until Congress makes it clear to the courts 
that people with non-conforming gender identities are a protected 
class in all antidiscrimination laws, transgender persons will be 
denied equal rights. 
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C1. 
 236. See Justin Ellis, Gender Lines Blurring in College Dorms, The University of 
Southern Maine Is One of a Growing Number of Universities Offering Co-Ed Rooms on 
Campus, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Me.), Feb. 11, 2007, at B1. One student explains that 
the gender-neutral policy at his school is really an advantage, but “[i]t’s college, there’s not 
much privacy no matter who you’re living with.” Id. 
237. See supra Part IV. 
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